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The objective of this paper Is to examine I i iftiwt




->vy ship.On the face of the undert , this Mg appos*
superfluous since basic the regulations of the U.S. Wavy 9pell out
the absolute responsibility of the CoairaandJ n;?: Officer toward? the
efficient and effective and economical on*»ration of hit command,
and the U.S. Navy Kegulati ons are supplemented by voluminous direc-
tives from each level of cob: .ftno senior to the Cora^andir.-- officer.
The basic nnd amplifying directives pertain lorgolj to the
assignment of the res-<on5-*biMt
, OHOVOTj sad eithtn "* imitations
of soofoi Mt ptjttoraa of sccoranlishment In certain li Me.
The Mthod of gomrol taplowmtttlefi la left to the individual.
This popor tbon, *i!l serve a? an m >f tthodology to
a li.rited decree, and to recognize cert: in generally overlooked
possibilities in the execution of 1 nr-,6 duties.
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~i- hu.it of txmAxmm omc
fceaprnsibilities of coirr.and cr.n be the subject of volumes
of instructl;:.?, directives, and * ell -meant advice find libraries
h=ve baan founded tad maintained in pursuit of definitive ra*
cise containment of the field. By derivation fr , valop-
went of fairly broad sections of U.S.Kavy Kagalatiana, 19h&$ it
is o to find precise statements concerning the ecawandli ttfl
officer's responsibility tor uch minute items as routine
raaintrinr-n.ee of anchor anginas and the numbers of pairs of soeka
which es^ch nwiia raust
Th4s examination is intended, however, to paraas the bror.der
int«r^ ' f the raanenaJ 'Pity of tha b - for
the leadership of his aoanaad as a whole.
The basic ohilosophy controlling tha conduct of the office
of a I In tha :-.: .Navy is centered on the concert of iapar-
sonality within the office, and the service scceots its lender-
ship by the axsapla sad personal standards of the incu- it the
office. This philosophy has been unco: ci >usly developed on some-
what the same basis as the standardisation and interchangeability
of parts in the products of American industry, Btaadardisatiaa
has b*f>n the underl .^rinciole »W Lttad the rapid
ress in the industrialisation of the nation daring this century,
rly, the philosophy of ce I s intarahangaatoiliti
of e "'icer^- -it turnover \n *
not disrupt the fu stic - to any sppraaiabla

extent.
The relative decree of" effectiveness of parf '" the
nd der>< ti J - 1 '. :?ura upon th jy the
naodiag offcer. Dyn- traomallty ad ability witMa iht
individual usually result in pre- ><;tiveness in the perfor-
airnce of the ee tried by the ] re
placid officer. The result rut affaetlvafta*! La purely relative
and is aaaatir* hove the level of ?«?ttsf' ctory results. This
represents only t- secondary trend which is Wp«rinpO on
the predicated primary tread of mooaaa that is inherent in the
>f th*» office. Minor trends vill be tier: *a—
the seriousness and degree, as well as the periodicity, of the
checks tad inspections of the status and progress of the co-rand
towards the achievement of the set objectives •hiah tha c. ending
officer conducts.
A comparison night be scconplished if mm could consider
a bsstc *nd mininum success pattern I tides of
tlie oce^.n. So Batter whal ni ;bt occur, tidal action tf access
or minimum effectiveness In nd is as ur^ . • ;:ves an r-
imposed upon tides, "nd yet more minor action is caused by wi
currents, but these secondary and "a .or actions or trends serve
onl to amplify preponderoasly, or negate to a minor degree* the
primary tidal action. i>o, 1 i ewlse, does the personalis the
Maouadlisg officer blend itself «»lth the inherent impersonality
of the basic office.
The st'-ndsrdo of success i'fectiveness of aaaaumd can be
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no differ? nt from those of the ptrtona] st It o 4' tht c • • -nd-
officer. It is he who must tot the tone of 1 into of
the command. It toy be exoected that tht ultimate ptrfonuMMM
standards of the contend will to elfttol; iklB to the natural personal
-nding of and his superficial ttaadtJ'
or desires will h've but little effect in the end. J-he oy twill
officer with the highest degree of personal integrity and highest
level of professional ethics will receive tht highest dearer of
loyalty from his eomsand} end the corar.?ndi'
""ly de-* ; the trt of n of responribility fmd
has developed trftoltotioatl ability is the one who will h.-.ve,
intvitr.bly, the most e^fe.c+ive NflBMBd*
X*rtriftblyf tht nd of this officer vill. Ito bo tht one
in utile rt If the le- ;f tension and Indecision, and
the one in which the sott interns! confidence ii f -unu. tntplratloa
of subordinates is infectuous tad strong leacU a
qurlitv of r:?iurO ptratttlos dow-nvi rds. This rermeetion requires
flrr nee, however, in orde to assure no occurence of mis-
feasance or non feasance d\)e to overenth'. on the p«rt of
the juniors.
There is no doubt but whet the success pattern of command
is somewhet comollcRted ^y the instability ?nd insecurity of tht
•es in which we art prttentl^ living. On on* hand we ^rv** 8
world in v.Mch undeclared wrrs art tat order of the , and new
intf ntl totoient ere continuous ex^ectrtionr:. ?<ch new
in-ident between the dominant conflicting ways of world 1i+'e
4r-

I too necesr'i tht ponMiMMit tiatalfUUKM Ol -mum
ooatbtt ef-iciency in each .d. The proper utilization of
the h ©f nervous energy wbleh It continuously un 5er
generation with the presence of these eondl Is • prist respon-
sibility of the QOWwadlBg officer so 1 the c -nditlons erlst.
On the other hand, Ul« i of the netion cannot lonp,
oxtrrvagenooa vhion war-conditions end pseudo «r~
conr'itions Foster in the r*sa^ntain&nce of the militar>. recog-
nitions of this principle 1 constant tffiad of tin Congress
and the i-*ublic I Congress represents. Lin-service will
not be toler— -id only the strictest interpret rtion of rules
rn i rf , ..-> r + orttm
*'
3 will nf ice
as the minimum re t. m ee is solu-
tions msat inel itorlal cs well at Mwondal
resou re • in order to qualify ss satisfactory answers I
pro'
rerilctions of '
Ltsry -will h*ve increasi icul.t probla
o rating funds, ?• ' >e, equipment, -•:-. iiv ' >s to t
problems will lay >ith the individual c on
*hori' th« responsibilities 1 i f the
manpower, arterial, and
-U.1 rt sources of t-.e milit,;;rj>
are placed. The of j'ic-: Pi of the Nsv>




tho be ft tho oorviooo rolfitivi
to the solution 'ense problon of 1
i? esition is not one which considers the itl ic or tactical
] poliaioo* nor is He one dofond the
needs of the services before the Congress. Once t) -e breadth of
! policy is date >d by the executive hrr.nch of the
i fin- need by tho legislative branch, the e ting
officer afloat is •Mignoo' tho responsibility of producing the
^< * offoetivo unit pooail thin the limitations of tho
resource? a r . Sufficient resourc invariable laaignol
his a 1 to Monro ntiniama m ission. Poroeight
- porlor planning ;-'iii' rt9 am -play of the
l«adorahip qualities ->reviousl < de?cri"be:, will produce the til ,—
in effectiveness. Shon ns level prodneod be thon I '
which is necessary to ?.s ure the general welff country,
roaooi i ailfiblo to the : be reduced
y hit aoporloi*0 if reouir- nents dictated ?nd tho roaourOOf :ade
available oloonhore ohorin the vital in the solut
of the overall national iofOBOO em.
is financial problems a lved at inn
level the r-v ficer littli »n for
the oonotarj valufl i resources ektrl i »t c - .
"Cost unc^rsciousners" rather than tho dosir*»d reverse, V§ footorod
by tho int tyatona of resources surrly. On a relative basis,
the monetary ollotaonto whieh ahip receives tan of but littlo
oonaoojaonoo in tho soaparioon of actual i of oper-
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stion. Comparison of costs in terras of manpower, raaterial, or
other yardstick, is not rasde as a normal procedure.
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II 3IAI A,c. 7Y AFTOAT
The lack of $r>pr<*elation of operation.nl eaeta of the Navy
sfloat are spre-d more widely then the sole province of the Command-
ing Officer. Cost fibres are available, out little or no use
is made of them to present a correl? icture to the o nf
personnel. Fach and every ( dinfc officer should be thoroughly
conversant with the capitalisation of his business enterprise,
and familiar *ith the operating cost*? thereof. Table I presents
a of such data for tvo combatant type ehios as well ae
one amphibious and one auxiliary type. A study of the figures
presented therein would indicate that the average ship afloat
represents a business within itself of larger magnitude then the
averape commercial undertaking. For ivr pwrpeeee, the
averape destroyer represents capital investment equivalent to
that of the AJRJWTWX 001 "^os o Laore, iarylend, mm of
the country's largest marine const ruction firrs. The destroyer
represents an original sepital outlay of reqoirsa
an average of :"1,1 50,000 for annual operating exnens-
fcealUation of these financial figures 3 the con-
clusion that the . • avy, in aggregate, is larger than any single
business enterprise of the nation.
It Le probable that the underlyiy reason for th*j lack of
reciatioa or the financial aapecta of the o I ion of afloat
SSSBUUUtS by their of-' t profits of the military enter-
orise are noi ured in financial terms, as woe the case
-8-

in the ratine baainaas undertaking. In the world of busir*
1« effectiveness of nt is
v
1udf:ed by the finfinciwl
dstick, snd the r.pno^eir.ent so ineffectual as to produce a
loss, or even a low standard of profit in *he Faaa of advanta-
geous conditions, nsust expect to be snort-lived.
The profit stsnd^rds of the kavy M sured in the terms
of ultinata contribution to tha organisation to
which the unit balottga. Xndtv , thia can d, in
terwr of the single sh'p, to - - cure of the overall effective-
no of the c I in its contribution. The yardsticks of coapar-
ison must be in the ae e, and develop-
ment of -5 ' bariali and finrncl
daaa< order, Since these ttandai I • multiple in nature,
they olace a more con: lie ?soonsibil it> uoon th- -ndin?
o^ BUhordlnataa* than would nlj
found in tha irable c dial ai on.
In orevious years, the financial aspects of c
received very little emphasis with the resultant condition that
little or no cietion ban oeen develop*- the Inportanaa of
this phaaa. Likewise, the i.vsilsbil it> of aar hc^ of
very little c aaara ta the eoamandlng affiear* ila orimary
concern hps baan in the develoo^-^t of fn? quality of er
necessary to Lb C ', por the quail'
supplied •--< livers been infarlor to the lev^l thai :
cor if affiear would normally
The extr; is generally
-9-

credited can be partially blamed to the lack of training in
financial thinklri; tit of Sjaaadlatal available cor-
related financial data to the individual comnr-ndinr of 'leer. The
adacation level, pen^r.-^l paraonal oharat ~nd ability of
tha c: offleara of oyr Bavj balng it le at equal to those
of taair countermart? in A_me-ican baalsaaa* it La raaaooabla to
aJMKuaa thr 1 ra aapabla of ad,lv their decisions to inclxide
more thoughtful consideration of financial aspect?, If that necessary
data am i inuously available rm.
aa of tba unavailability of the gaaaral fiscal pra-
sentftion, it is incumbent upon tha Etc ling of net to
ralefj these thin -shits, and to instill in his subordin-
ates sufficient confidence by Ms example upon vhich to base thair
oifin expansion of cost-consciousness. It is a further re uire-
ment that the anaBMmdl ng oi Insist that every decision be
examined in each of trie aspects of tha ccon.my, and ish




IV IFLTOATIOS or IILITI
In acceptance of the absolute responsibility for ths oerfor-
mance of his command, ths commanding officer obligates himself to
produce an efficient management of the so Band* To this end, the
commanding officer is the "top mansgement" of the command, and
in recognition thereof, the U. Li. Navy Bsgslations afford the command-
ing officer suitable prerogatives, The regulations also stipulate
the minimum extent of responsibility delegation downwards to the
level of Heads of Bspartatenta which he must implement. It is Y»ell
recognised that much more th-n regulations is required to coordin-
ate the efforts of a cor-wand, and it is therein that the command* ng
officer becomes i true manner.
Delegation of responsibilities cannot be successfully accom-
plished -without the simultaneous delegation of compensatory
authority. In so far as is practical, the delegations of respon-
sibility and authority should be reduced, to v/riting in order to
SI arc complete understanding of the limitations intended.
farther, the aggregate of the delegated responsibility must
be examined against the defined mission of the command in order
to -ssure fulfillment of the mission. This is best • I by-
establishing an operating plan for the guidance of the cm mend
one iat vhich the examination of tht -gate can be made.
Once this examination La satisfactorily completed, su-srvirion
of the command r^&^r^r itself 1""' th relatively of
inspections and checks to ^saure maintainance of the prescribed
-11-

standards and performance quality.
It is axiomatic that delegated responsibilities and resul-
nt tasks must be within the capabilities of the men to wh
they are assigned* The capabilities of the individuals of the
command must be assessed and a cons + of evaluation of
the capabilities of groups must be maintained as the training
of groups progresses.
The corollary to this axiom is that the full capabilities
of the available mannover mu^t be utilized. Non-utilisation to
the fullest extent invariably results in a continual lowering of
morale level, as well as a wastage of eanpewei resources. Full
utilization of caoabilities not only fosters a high degree of
self-satisfaction amongst men individually thus becoming the
fiim basis upon which to build ever-increasing level of hi
morale within a command, but it also reduces manpower requirements
numerically.
The establishment of a comprehensive record for eaes officer
and enlist* an within the command is a prerequisite to full
capability utilisation* The record system must be simple, easily
workable, and available to all management levels within the limits
of manpower assigned to them. Further, it must be based upon
realistic evaluation of the individual. Such a record system




The eomandlng officer of an afloat eesn&nd Lnheritfl from
his predecessor an organization vhich has been developed from a
combination of time honored nave' experience and directives of
the basic U.t.Navy Regulations. The regulation book dictate*
certain minimum organizational patterns, end type commanders have
""ified the minimum pattern to the extent of rigidity. There
being no option in the matter of organisation pattern left to
the Bommanding officer (without a proeeas the length of which is
-urate v-ith the degree cf desired change), there is gener-
ally very little interest displayed in the other factors of import-
ance to organizational planning.
The lack of interest is abetted by the fact that personnel
assignment to the • is achieved by the prooeaa of detailing
an officer or man in accordance with vacancies in the allowance list,
The allowance list of the ahip is base* upon the dvpree of techni-
cal knowledge required +o operate the arioua ac onenta of 1
,
and in theory, were each billet filled by a man poeaeasing
exactly the required oualifi cat ions preaeribed for th- + billet,
the shin would be Banned at the minimum level needed for efficient
rations* Too often, the eorsmanding officer finds himself
faced with a crev which is woefully ina.decuate in technics
qualifications in acme specialties, but numeric:-! ly sufficient
as a whole.
It is with this situation that the organi: 1 ability
-13-

of the commanding officer is of great importance. In an organiza-
tion as closely knit as that of s sh inboard command, co ' >11-
ity is essential. Man work, eat, and sleep in Batch closer
proximity than v.ould be normal in a civilian pursuit. Steadiness
and maturity of .judgement are also prime requisites. It is there-
fore important that each man be evaluated against his assigned
billet requirements to assure maxlnosi performance of the unit
with a minimum of friction development and resultant discontent.
Ls aspect of organization requires that jo ; analysts be
prepared, and realistically as: eased. The validity of tasks crust
be assured and -work not essential to the fulfillment of the
mission must bfa eliminated* Very often, preparation of job
analyses and validation thereof is ignored in the afloat command.
Comparison of the Joo analyses and the ''ications of
av?' personnel then form a basis upon which realistic train-
ing program c n be astahllshed. The theory that the Bureau of
Personnel ^nd the Service Commands provide trie command with ade- •
ourte personnel to meet the requirements of the command as repre-
sented by the allowance list must be accepted by the type commander
and the Navy as a vhole. without acceptance of thif :'y,
standards of performance -would be based upon the lesser capabil-
ities and would be v.holly inadequate to the needs of tne se vice.
The only acceptable solution lay in the recognition that this
assumption is valid in theory on] rid places the incumbers of
development of t.he individuals uoon the commanding officer
•
The need of training programs is veil recognised, but too often
-11-

the program is not predicated upon the needs of the individual
and thus valuable time and effort is wasted in needless repiti-
tion and duplication of training.
Inadequate performance by the individaa! frecuently blamed
upon his "lack of quailfleati , and the Bureau of Personnel and
the Service Force la criticized for the assignment of that individual
to the comrand. Too often the true responsibility for poor ,er-
formance lay within the command and San be traced to inadnouate
supervision. Continuous supervision met be provided at all levels
and the eostnanding: officer must be active in the lcade r of
this element of the ergani national performance of the cormiand.
He mu^t be active in the training of his suoervisors in the factor
of group leadership and the establishment and maintainanc-1' of
proper staffing ratios of supervisors to workmen within the
command.
The factor of insoecti-vn in organizational oerf ormsnee is
misunderstood very often. There is a defir ; I srt of inspection.
To succesefully d^v^Toe that art. there west be recognition of
psychological ^aoect that a sailor or officer is entitled to an
inspection by his superiors, and that a succe?laful passage of the
inspection is recognition of satisfaction with the level of per-
formance of the individual; and more important to the individual,
satisfaction or pier sure if such is expressed, with his personal
ability and orogress. Subordinates have the right to expect that
their work -will be inspected, and too often, inspections are




The 001 Lng officer hum that each officer and
man fully understands the i^ter-reletionship of the various depart-
ments and divisions of the command. These relati: r shins are
covered in the indoctrination schedule of any , but assurance
must be obtained that there is full appreciation of the objectives
of the commend and its son tenants in order sure of intelligent
application of offort either by an individual or by a group
T&ithin the command. This understanding is basic to the acceptance
of the principle of organizational and human relationships through-
out the command.
The decree of acceptance of organi7stional and human relation-
ships can be easily determined aboard a shin. Living conditions
are such as to be conducive to earl> recognition of signs of
internal strife and friction. As the command gets larger and
personal contact >vith lo*er level subordinates becomes less fre-
quent, the commanding officer must place more dependence upon
his key subordinates in this reepect. Ibis dependence can only
~ist and not replace the commanding officer* s own observations,
however.
Fromotion of human relations in an organization reduces
itself in some respect to the promotion of teamv-ork vithin the
command and the components thereof. The commanding officer Viho
becomes the head coach and. is assisted in the coaching functions by
his heads of departnenta is the officer *ho has recognized human
relations as a major aspect of command.
-16-

Obviously, the commanding officer must be discreet in intro-
ducing changes within a command, particularly ii a change is to be
made » ithin the organizational relationships of the command. He
must assure himself that the full implications of the c are
•well underst ad accepted as desirable, or possibly he vi.ll
find an untenable dissatisfaction which so often breads uncoop-
erative attitudes* In e ship, offie d sailors alike have
KB intense personal interest in their jo Lch must be recc -
nized. Therr is not one who is not interested in the operating
ef iciency of the ship, and. in the competence of his i i ie
leader. The underlying basis for this interest is his personal
knowledge that upon the ef 'iciency of the shin ?nd the quality
of leadership which he provides and is provided to him his "Life
mi M. eventually de n . This knowledge is inherent and because
it is not close to the surface of the individual, it is not often
the source of thought by him. The apparent reason for his intense
Interest is comparatively more superficial; It comorises the
intereat that one normally has in his honej food, and recreation.
Qhangea which effect the individual and are not understood by
him produce ?nd undesirable rnd emotional imoact.
Basically, the organization of a ship is not an larpersom
entity. The oommanding officer mu^t fit the human element to
th s organisation, or • v or the are" of difference be-
tween the oapabilitias required by the organizational pattern and
those present in the ere?.- provided to him. The blendinp of the
human relationships with the established organization^ patters
-17-

is basic to a satisfactory level of orysnlzational performance.
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V C SAITOH CHA
The commanding officer has e. Boat effective device for test-
ing the theoretical efficiency of an organization and for pre-
dicting the probable quality of end product of his command. Thi6
device is the organisation chart. Because of inexperience in the
of eharta and their a lities, the n ;e officer is
reluctant to expend mich effort in their production. In order to
be of practical value* J ! ft mist be constructed in sues a
manner as to show, factually , where authority and responsibility
really sre located. The factual chart in i he organizational
information is r^adil;1/ discernable, is noet useful. Hoveve?,
the presence of theoretical assignment of responsibility in one
area -when the actual exercise of the commeasurate authority is
far removed, invalidates the chart for accurate usage.
By tei the chart, lines of coromunicat Lon and dele ation of
responsibility become visual and valuabLe aids in the elimination
of unnecessary duplication of effort. The relationships between
associated task ate are evident, and the chart thus becomes
an assurance that other interested rorV ar> ' ed
in the solution of a problem end further, it assures that no
:nt vith » everlapping interesl \a-
ated from a problem because of unilat ction.
snisstion charts should be prenared, oublisned, md
understood by the entire soanand* These charts should not only
indicate lines of authority and responsibility, but lines of
-19-

communicati n u well . Separate charts should be prepared de-
tailing the functions of each ur.it of the co^nand In order that
positive control c?n be maintained over ever-present tendencies to
duplic >rlr. A functional charl
,
prepared Ln a cryptic form
and easily understood serves this purpose very well.
Such permanent reference Lat ev er of a cor-ir.and,
and the best, efforts of the oosmand she.' ded in their
preparation and continuous maintfiinanee. Organisation charts
b ile to the blueprints use the construction of a
machine. They are the blueprints of the co-wand, and the : ty
of their preparation reflects itself within the organization in
the same manner as blueprints reflection would appear in the
machine.
The use of charts in combination with jc criptions to
location of primary responsibd of unit 3
eliminates sources of potential mi sunder J provi
Llj accessible ref
to whom criticism or r>rai kite
produced. If there de knowledge at lerele Junior to him
of 1 -ct that sponsibility is •
,
Lll
exert much stronger efforts towards the successful accost lishment




The problem of adequate supervision is
one confronting tJ rficer, particularly one
the position. There ere definite tendencies toward the
t of abnormal amounts of attention to a relatively fei areas
o f the conr.md to the exclusion of the remainder. This sometines
stems from the laek of, or presence of, previous experience in
certain fields of endeavor and the dlvisioE
officers ay >e the unconscious oroduct of his feeling of
inadequacy or expertneea in the affected fields. It is Important
at the officer give ecu. d behaviour to
U parts f his so sand studiously. In this manner only c?n
the feelic partiality be el ad*
^Quality of attention to all units of the cor issures
the commanding officer that ooportunities are beinp' created con-
tinuously for those officers and men with assigned responsibil-
ities to hare access to hin end all time. The concept that the
commanding officer is a valuable resource to his subordinates is
dev , 'nd his assist ~nce in siding subordinates to au
decisions bestows confidence in the officer or man involved in
his own ability to oerform to the satisfaction of his superiors.
The commanding officer who leaves the imoression that decisions
have been developed and rendered by the subordinate rether than
Lnself is sreating rce of future time for himself




o r the subordinate. His objective
should i train " his subordinates to receive delegated
authority and responsibility and to make decisions for theruselveo.
This involves continuous inspection and informs! observation
of all departments and divisions of the command. Invariable, the
Hi deoar' i command are assigned fleers
y.ith tho moat effective experience and ability in the field of
their departmental activity, hincii.-ns of leaser 1- ,ce
generall d to officers vsith little experience, with
the coneecuence that the time of the command! • r in the
arrloioa ©f the less igniflaont funeiiona ii oi >opro-
-or l ictivit . n-
en is round in the seasr of tho sort I ono©4
officers vho hood the -V • • j f >. In
this manner, the ooonoadlng offtear eoAj " Lth oloor eoaooionc
sr>end i -mounts oJ -ties c
development of the a c of dk est!
vision leaders is a took of
of doportoontl Hoot bo onoouraged by the ox the commanding
to delegate the 1 •ibllitlt* . tc da
in thf ir oool the oftpooitj to receive responsibility, and
Lity to work with others.
On*8 o: .. objectives of o, io
'en of futon • offloor
•
availability of io of i ttl
oooonpliohjoonl ' r Me • nt ^ J'
-2f.

and crpv entrusted to hit 8 re. He raws 4- ftrautdM to set,
:an obtcin that freedom only by cres* e as s re-
sult of nutusl confidence instilled by careful. 1 . planned 9V
vision of th« eomuHUi*

VT' PHILOSOPHY.
vicus reference has been nade to the messu ofit
in the a'loat command. It is ie?sur?d primarily by the degree
tb- lt*rl&l fire usee! effectively, e , and
wisely. Second i , the raenfuroraent of effective usa^e of
financial resources is indicative of the profit standards, out
since the coramandinp' officer afloat has so little control over the
usR^e of the finencial resowces of the Ntvy, tnis MMttt
is of leaner sip-nificance on a relative basis. The cowrsndinp;
officer controls only the items, Miscellaneous Supplies ~nd
ouippe'e", and "Subsistence" sho^n in T?b!e I, although he has
some influence over the I Itures of the other monies.
*oo often however, the t it ecc • 1 usage c ower
?nd -:rtprisil i. r •WP-looked since the co; =ndln»? of leer &tn C: not
directly control the expenditure of funds for payroll, fuel,
ammunition, or repairs. There beinp no convenient
;y ardst
available for (Betting n Bptrmtloa in f>r.rncial t^rws, the unit
of racnpower remains fin?nclsllj unvalued in -lannir, nd execut-
ing a routine t sk. Lack of similar convenient „-
affects planning r-.nd execution of operations usin^ fuel and
ammunition. The inierxrtion of cost yardsticks must be accom-
plished in the d^terr' m of economic?! usp.re. Hat ^s
well as manpower can be used effectively ut uneconor 1c-ldy in
terms of financial costs. The elen^nt of *is d iudgement
* included in the ovarii r>lan- or manpower and material
-fir*

expenditures, *-hen these elements hsve been properly balanced,
optimum results c-n be anticipated.
ofIt standard* of the • m nst be set by the
comrandinp officer in the absence of def row
suo^riors. Whether prescribed for, sr develeped by tilt 90HMH
inp officer, the stead*) uld be reduced to E;ansgable fore
the u?rpp of the «t nd-r's required.
The problem of economical usage of manpower cannot be approach-
ed from the testing viewpoint only. The utilisation of 11-
ities, experience, and cuality of manpower availeble must also
be evaluated. Examination of work programs and schedules would
produce an indication providing an inventory of these factors were
available against vhleh judgement might be assessed.
The problem of Y>ise usage of manpower presents equal oppor-
tunity for nature judgement In solution. Work simplification
programs, and methods analysis reduce the requirement for manpower
ex endttures freouently, and quite often reduce the cuality of
manpower required to produce lbs desired result.?. The quality
of work produced by nan-ower is often inferior to that produced
I ine. The effect uoon the morale of* the workman is often
rftsvaststiag v-hen he '-cnows ta«t the product of his efforts are
inferior to results of other asthods of available orodaction,
and equal effect is probable when he rerlizeF thai he i<-
oyed below the limits of hi bilities.
It is admitted that the I trsla projected
oreirn to the t, raining afforded the average officer or

pet*y officer. IfVtfVl , the averepr officer or pet* ' ?«r is
sympathetic to the Implications of the ' and c*n be trained
to-wsrds desired objectives. l*he philosophy is rr, -levintion
fro* t t1 Ui universal employment, and c ss a result of this
Btt He -raciu&lly snd la oontpany *ith « program of
education if the desired .-esults sre to be achieved.
-?6-

VIII T T T
The emersion of Heads of -lents, subordinate officers,
mc' officers to the philosophy o r man at is not en
insurmountable problem when MM ooocidtlt the general high intell-
ectual level of the average sailor and further considers th^at
there already exists fair decree of expertness in any mval
organization. On the average, officers and oetty officers have
n in the Navy for raany years and have developer' p. pre/it a«irunt
of nkno»hov. r in the execution of their everyday duties, "very-
officer and ^etty officer is susceptible to an active su- ry
training orograra if t i ^rofpram is dresse vith an attractive
roach. F#i commands such a progrtB, but t. ose
•which have done so h-ve attained advantageous results.
Exercise of the full scope of Ltgattd responsibility snd
corresponding authority develops men to the full their
tbllitiM foster than any other method, but active supervision
by the commanding officer must be provided together mth the
recognition tl L:takes robeble <ith those m reviously
unused to MM oir ov,n problems. The delegation muft
be aeooapani«d kill fully construct here of taut
confidence bt officer ad his n ',
snd an stmosphere of freedom in vb cj su'~>ordi , :B+e nay I
: express himself most be de-vel > . . tills eta
,
rvisors are to listen to I is
an incentive or- vide'} to stimulate suggestions from them.
—7-

Xagtntity is re officer in th* conduct
of his attparrlaioaj in order to preserve the sjtmosphere of freedom
•on.-.i;! those- receiving his attention.
The Institution of a supervisory training program results
fron> p reco^nlti r of Ins ne*»d of training officers an r-
visors in the field of hwaan ralatlonahipSj and i l?es the
fact that the personnel of the rr* the most valuable as-
of thp eoa»a»d* The dynamics of behavior era not veil understood
in the nnval service md the oro^ram *hich provides motivation
rather than frustration is the program whieh wil~ ic-
slly received. Such training is of I—adiata benefit to both t
individual and the Nnvv, and the results will roagnifv rather than




A review of the me ect of com and afloat *ould
bo inc; ;. without titing the enormity of t ^onslbllity
of the oaiwndim officer for the capital investment in tht
materiel which is assigned his co-.-and. The original capital
investment in a destro>er is $9*50!?,000 and the vslue of that
investment is Pein£ cor.st-mtl;, maintained ana in MM respects,
improved. Itepl
n
cement costs voul< i ?1 in excess of those
indicated in Table I at the rel?tivel> inflated cost? of today's
market. The attitude that the s? * of public property
need not receive the same consideration end attention M the
protection of one** privtf* property indirectly prows from the
of appreciation of the co^ts of public property, thlf ctti-
tude is not universal by any means, out it is observed with
sufficient frequency sp to assume the proportions of a najor
proolem.
&aintainance of the ship snd its ec.ui ^raent is a problM of
tremendous importance from both economical and operational joints
of vie*, The success of the maintainanee program is largely the
result of the interest end attitude of the individual towazds the
portion of the ship for whltfh he is responsible. The I
of the re^onsible sailor can be kept flliTO by assurance of
ending of the part which his MtihiM or cc
raent olays in the p -nc?5 of the command and the t
of a mpltU understf ndinp of the result r of lo* ratoriel
-29-

performance by Is unit.
Tendencies to hoard supolit expenditure of ef ort
towards the fnaintaineince of excess stocks of supplies and re-
placement osrts must be dir ;«d in order to channel the
entire efforts of available Mopovcr into productiveness of
ience to +* a trfbrsanot of the mission.
Since the s+andsrda of profit la i the effective, «»con-
onical and *lse use of materiel as «tl1 M MDjMfl , H is in-
dent uoon the cowandinp officer to examine tho *ork programs
cf fell very carefully, and to assure bittMlf of t-e con-
tinuous reflection of the con<msnd*s actual materiel condition
in the current ship's nsaintainence project files. As super-
visors attain acce I standards of utilieation of MBpovcr,
they «H1 nlwiltlMHUiinlj cain sn appreciation for ttM ro >er,
efficient, and economical sage of their equipment. A s they
develop a high standard of pcrf >r-iance, an emotional ac I I -ice
of the standards of "profit" *ill become inherent, and Lcta





Th© morale as an asoect of importance to the command furc-
tion eannot be ienored. The c -nding of ric*r - t the
oolici oipevsr, the t llilg officer ccnnot maintain nersonel
contact vith every officer BIMJ mUot continuously and nor-
depone the kind and quality of c >ntects between the comrsnd
as renresented by the officers end petty officers on one hand
and the sailor on the other. Morale is the summation of indivi
d
rt + itudes snd the point of reel contact and development of marale
is at the level of first supervision.
In order to understand the problem of building morale, it
is first nesesssry to understand the cleaning of the vor . ihe
ictionary defines morale as "mental strte, especial
as regards real, deter Lor, hcpe, devotion, end the li
*hich may ma^e e man or body of raen a r enchv -nd of
^everinf; with c in the presence of denser, fctirue,
(Useoarageaent, etc.". ir. iiUtHI Parker summarises his defini-
tion of morale p.f "^or^le is the at'itude held by the individual
memberr of I -which aiekes them ~:eivment of the
goals ahes«? of acheivment of personal poala".
her of the cited definitions is sc^f , for they make
the same point In different *timers. There is m Lo >ey to
prodeoe i te of ecrala oxa srd rork on the pert of
the coraT-andin? officer. It is he 'who sets the tone of the command.
In order for a hiph state of ..orale to exist, the sail r
- 1-

must identify himself with the command, find build his on
a f~vo ;-f>] tloaohip botwoen his dut; , s\ io, r.nd shipmates.
There are those who maintain that, the state of morale is :;uanti-
t lively measures ble through factors such as the state of discip-
line; re-e:ilistment incidence; and venerisl, neuropsychiatries
and sick rates. *«hereas there is soae decree of relieDle indi-
lotloa cssible by a coordination of these factors, the true
measure of the status of raorrle must be found in the general
attitude of the individual sailor.
The level of MNlt of a shin is lndj -y ¥ MtlMi
of the morale of the majority of the sailors in the !>—snil
ifte Morale of the a I is directly dependant upon the morale
of each individual. Aher?fore, ilea of the NMtod!
officer of Rifiintainance and improvement of morale lay in +
nt of trie morale o- I individual in the group* *>ince
the identity of the individual with the command is so 1
daily contacts with nil Lata super-
visor or potty officer, it would sripe&r that, the efforts of morale
improvement by the OOOMMtittg officer snould bo at the level of
the first line of I or. This is an additional ar ument
for the establishment of an effective supervisory training
propram within 1 ' - c ~od.
fciuch has been written, both within naval periodicals and
in non-naval pobliootlono, on the gonorol subject of building
and maintainance of h : • levels. Methods of examination
and suggestions as to nrocednres are numerous, further oapll-
-32-

ficfitlon herein »culd serve no usreful purpose. The commending
officer c n and mould avail himself of the opportunities pro-
vided in this field.
-33-

aThe study of the various BftntgOMi I M ects of c
prodaeee +l " Lou that
'
Li ue 1 ' aor* than iladlax-
ity between d Afloet • n I To nt. It sup- orts the
conclusion thr.t Caaaiend Afloat is To-: Kaai '. It vould
• the c tied to such duty must adr 1
himself to the philosophy and Banner of thinking of To--? MaAafeaettt<
+ Vi the levels of aanpowor lowly adbranolngj tl
inp officer c^n no longer depend upon v->^r^n-';-!,ory orders to con-
duct the affairs of his con- - l, mat Babetltvte • leader-
shin in which hunan-organiaational relationships are recognized
snd in rhich delegation of responsibility is basic.
In the- final analysis, it i? ti clival 1 eraej
of sailors that produces outstand^ tri ad inakes the
an effective unit of the fleet, -orkload can bo divided
in aeoordanee with the ability znd fair-share of the burden,
I the objective of the combined - -well defined,
out only the ere* of tile ship can achieve, the tjoala* Sao vise
officer does an Ible to help his cre>,





CAPITALIZATION AND 0PrRATING COSTS OF TYPICAL SHIPS
2200 Ton 122 Class . AKA 1 - 20 LSD
Capital Costs Destroyer Cruiser









gov ' t . fu rnish-
ed equipment 9,505,000 11,052,000 li, 669,000 6,51s5,000
and armament
* Dftftlga "onnage 2,200 13,600 7,1?0 L,h90
* Cost ner design $ 1,300 I 3,000 $ 650 ' 1,1:50
ton
Operating Costs on Average, Annual, Basis
«• F\iel, actual $ 126,156
* Alterations, 150,000
estimate
* Repairs, estimate 125,000
lee, ies 120,800
and Equipage, actual





* Trsinin~ Aatnltiofi 21 *,<-') n
Actual
§ restricted avails- 1 1,000
biliti*»s,estriated
Training and Education ? ? ? ?
00 Total Operating $1, 139,317 I 5,138,568 $ une- id % unestinated
* l^urrau of ohlps, 16 *eb. 1953
# ^avy -o.^ntroller, 1952 eeti
4 r^reau f Su piles end Accounte, 23 Feb. 1953, average for 1952
ft » • » • § i 7 [ 9b.l953, "M Navy Comptroller, 1952 estimates: This does not repr sent arith-
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